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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
RALPH GREENFIELD:

A survey of cases in which appellate courts have reviewed decisions of public assistance agencies suggests that the most important single factor affecting the scope of court review has been the
nature of the claim to public assistance as a legally enforcible right.
Because of the importance of this factor, consideiation will be
given initially to some of the cases in which the courts have authoritatively defined the nature of the right or claim to public assistance.
The latter part of this article is concerned with an analysis
of those cases which deal with the issue of judicial control over
agency decisions. These cases fall into three broad categories. The
first includes cases based on statutes that expressly circumscribe
the review of agency decisions. The second concerns cases that
arose in the absence of statutes authorizing judicial review. The
third group of cases stem from statutes providing for a court
review of agency determinations. Because of space limitations
this article does not include a discussion of the last group of cases.
I.

NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

At common law needy persons in England had no legal right
or claim to public support. Thus Blackstone tells us that until the
reign of Henry VIII, poor and destitute persons were wholly dependent upon the private benevolence of neighbors and the charity
of well-disposed Christians.1 But beginning with the reign of the
Tudors, many statutes were enacted which defined the right of
indigent persons to receive aid from the local poor relief authorities. One of these statutes, known as the Elizabethan Poor Law
(43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601), remained the underlying basis of England's
public assistance laws until 1927.2
The history of the English poor law is significant, in this context, because it indicates that since the days of the Tudors relief
of the poor has been a subject of parliamentary concern and that
the legal right to claim public aid has always stemmed from a legislative enactment.2
Additional interest attaches to the English poor law because
the main features of the assistance laws adopted by the American
colonies were based on the Elizabethan Poor Law, and are still to be
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 BI. Comm. 359 (Cooley's Fourth Edition).

2 For a short history of the English poor law see de Schweinitz, England's
Road to Social Security 26 (1943); a more authoritative treatment is to be
found in S. and B. Webb, English Local Government: English Poor Law History: Part I, The Old Poor Law (1927).

'Op.

cit.,supra, note 2.
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found in most state general assistance laws.4 Later the formal adoption of the English common law by most American states, resulted
in the common law concept of the right to public aid being followed
in the United States.
The cases discussed below show the relative unanimity with
which American courts have followed the English common law
rule concerning the right to publ'c assistance.
In a 1911 decision the Iowa Supreme Court had occasion to
reiterate the rule that support of the poor was not a municipal
function at common law. It found that, by ordinance of the "ancient kings," the poor were to be supported by parsons, church
rectors, and by parishioners until, about the time of Henry VIII,
the law made paupers a charge on certain municipalities. The
court then held, under the facts of the case, that in the absence
of a positive legislative enactment, no obligation rested on a municipality to pay expenses incurred for aid to the needy. No duty
could be implied since a municipal corporation was not legally or
morally obligated to care for the poor. Since the duty is created
only by an affirmative statute, it cannot be carried farther than
the express provisions of the poor laws. Cerro Gordo County v.
Boone County.5 In an early Colorado case the Supreme Court gave
adherence to the general rule that paupers could not be considered "public charges" unless expressly made such by statute.
County of Saguache v. Tough.6 In a Washington case an amendment to the Mother's Pension Act, which restricted coverage under
the law, was challenged on constitutional grounds. The court upheld the statute indicating that no legal obligation rested on the
state to assist the indigent. Since the state is not an obligor, it
may care for the needy in any manner it pleases. No individual
or class can acquire a vested right to be cared for in any particular manner. There is therefore no duty that can be enforced in
law. Such relief as the state does provide is legally in the nature
of a largess or bounty which may be discontinued at the legislative
will. In re Snyder.7 During the great depression of the thirties
an applicant for poor relief in Douglas County, Nebraska, sought
a peremptory writ of mandamus, requiring the county commissioners to provide aid for his family and all other poor and destitute
persons similarly situated. Apparently uninfluenced by the exist' Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 685-689 (1950); Abbott,
Public Assistance 7 (1940). As suggested above, state general assistance statutes developed from the Elizabethan Poor Law. Under such laws aid is extended
to needy persons in general. The special or categorical assistance programs,
under the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A., Sec. 301-306; 601-606; 12011206; and 1351-1355) and implementing state laws, provide aid to designated
classes of needy persons, such as the aged, dependent children, the blind, and
the permanently and totally disabled. The latter laws, because of the many procedural protections accorded claimants, represent a striking departure from
traditional poor law philosophy.
152 Iowa 692, 133 N. W. 132, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 161 (1911).
645
Colo. 395, 101 P. 411 (1909).
160 P. 13 (1916).
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ing emergency, the court followed the general rule that there was
no common law liability upon any government unit to assist indigent persons. The court specifically held that the liability if any,
must arise by virtue of statutes making it the duty of the county.
Hence paupers were not public charges unless made so by statute.
State ex rel. Boxberger v. Burns, et al.8 In People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 9 the Illinois court denied that any governmental
unit had a common law duty to aid persons without means of support. Apart from a duty created by statute, the court could discern no legal obligation resting upon either the state or local units
to assist the needy. For additional cases in accord see Town of
Morristown v. Town of Hardwick,1 ° Town2 of Clearwater v. Town
1
Patrick v. Town of Baldwin.1
ofGarfield,"
With the enactment by Congress in 1935 of the Social Security
Act the era of modern public assistance legislation in the United
States began.1 3 Under the stimulus of Federal grants in aid, the
states rapidly passed laws, in conformity with the Federal act,
providing public aid for the needy aged, blind, and dependent children. These laws, with their provisions for operation of the programs on a uniform state-wide basis, confidentiality of assistance
records, payment in cash, and the opportunity for a fair hearing
before the state administrative agency, represented a striking departure from the early poor laws.
Despite the new substantive and procedural rights conferred
by the Social Security Act upon defined classes of the needy, the
courts continued to regard the right to public aid as purely statutory and therefore in the nature of a gratuity from the sovereign.
One authority has suggested, in explanation of the unchanged judicial attitude, that the draftsmen of the Federal law did not
believe it necessary to require, as a condition of the Federal grant,
that the implementing state law declare the existence of a legal
right. This belief being based on the assumption that the rights
created by the Social Security Act automatically became subject
to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 As is well known by
specialists in this field, cases decided after the enactment of the
Social Security Act have shown this assumption to be an untenabre
one. While many recent cases can be cited in support of this conclusion, a representative selection should suffice for the purpose
of this analysis.
Following the adoption of the basic Washington old-age assistance act, the Washington court interpreted the act as entitling
N. W. 656 (1937).
Ill. 557, 30 N. E. (2d) 46, 50, 132 A.L.R. 511.
Vt. 31, 69 A. 152.
Neb. 697, 91 N. W. 496.
12109 Wis. 342, 85 N. W. 274, 53 L.R.A. 613.
" 42 U. S. C. A., Sec. 301-306; 601-606; and 1201-1206.
"4 A. Delafield Smith, "Public Assistance As a Social Obligation," 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 266, 268.
'270
'374
1081
" 65
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a designated class of persons to claim benefits from the State. Such
entitlement, however, did no more than confer a statutory privilege. If the privilege was to be dignified by being called a right,
it was one that was subject to legislative abrogation. Consequently
it was not to be considered a vested right in the sense that it was
property or a right that had become fixed in such manner that
the beneficiary could not be deprived of it without his consent.
Adams v. Ernst, Director of Social Security et al.15 In the case of
Creighton v. Pope County, 16 the Illinois court made it clear, by
way of dictum, that the general rule would not be applicable to
rights which had vested because of contributions paid under a
pension law into a pension fund. If, as in the instant case, the
right to the pension rested on no more basis than a claim to the
state's bounty under an assistance statute, such right was not a
vested one and the payment was no more than gratuity. For additional recent authorities on the general rules see Howlett v. State
Commission,1 7 Chapman v. State Social Security
Social Security
Commission,'8 Hardy v. State Social Security Commission,19 and
20
Hart v. Grays Harbor County.
In the decided cases, where the nature of the right to receive
aid has been an issue, the courts are as one in declaring that such
right is a bounty or a privilege. Nevertheless, there are holdings
by a few courts which suggest an inclination to traverse new
pathways.
In Bowman v. Frost,2" the court dealt with the contention that
the aid to the blind statute violated the constitutional prohibition
against the grant of exclusive public emoluments or privileges to
axqy man or set of men. The act was held valid since the prohibition did not apply to cases where a payment is made to satisfy an
"inherent duty." When the legislature makes a commitment by
statute to assume an obligation the right of the person coming
within the statute attaches. The aid extended to the eligible needy
person is not a mere gift or bounty, but is a payment in discharge
of a public duty owed by society.
While the Kentucky court gave no authority for its holding
that public aid under a statute was not a gift, the case may well
become a landmark for the developing law of the future. On this
assumption it may be worthwhile to examine the reasoning by
which the court reached its conclusion. The court conceded that
at common law the state had no duty to assist the underprivileged.
It agreed that the legal right to apply for and receive public aid
derived from the statute. Query, if no legal duty antecedent to a
statute exists, in what sense was the court using the concepts of
1'1

Wash. (2d) 254, 95 P. (2d) 799.
6386 Ill. 468, 54 N. E. (2d) 543, 153 A.L.R. 802.
347 Mo. 784, 149 S. W. (2d) 806.
," 235 Mo. 698, 147 S. W. (2d) 157.
9187 S. W. (2d) 520.
'86 P. (2d) 198.
"289 Ky. 826, 158 S. W. (2d) 945.
1
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"inherent duty" and "public duty"? When the opinion is read as
a whole these concepts become less obscure. A civilized society
develops through time a sense of obligation toward its needy members. This sense of duty becomes more pervasive through the social
fabric. Organized society eventually recognizes a right in its dependent members. It is then that the community by statute makes
a commitment that none of its members shall suffer when in need.
In a mandamus proceeding the California State Board of
Social Welfare sought to compel the county of Los Angeles to
make certain payments of public aid retroactively. In one of three
factual situations, the recipient of old-age assistance had requested
an administrative hearing before the State Board for the reason
that he believed himself entitled to a larger payment than he had
been receiving. Before the hearing was held, the county agency
redetermined the recipient's need and paid an increased amount
as of the date of the redetermination. When the hearing was held
by the state agency, the county representative conceded that the
initial determination had been incorrect but denied the authority
of the State Board to order payment of the proper amount on a
retroactive basis. Under these facts, the court unequivocally found
a duty to pay which accrued as of the date the applicant was first
entitled to receive payment. This duty to pay was the equivalent
of a debt due from the county to the applicant. In another situation the county asserted that the payment of aid retroactively to
the estate of the deceased recipient would constitute an unlawful
gift of public money. The court resolved this issue by ruling that
while the assistance law makes the right to recive aid personal
and inalienable, it nevertheless does not preclude the residue of
assistance remaining after payment, or the right to receive aid
which has accrued from being subject to devolution as a common
incident of the recipient's
property right. Board of Social Welfare
22
v. Los Angeles County.
II.

PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY STATUTE

There is little direct authority on the validity of statutes which
directly or by implication curtail judicial review of public aid
agency decisions. In lieu of specific authority, it seems appropriate to cite cases affecting other administrative agencies where
the agency involved was administering a benefactory program and
the program has been considered by the courts as coming within
the classification of a gratuity, privilege, or self-imposed claim.
In an Oklahoma case the court upheld the constitutionality of
the old-age assistance law which made the decision of the County
Assistance Board and the Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission
final on questions of fact. The court declared that whenever a
government, as a matter of grace, provides for giving a gratuity
or bounty within the terms of a statute, it has full power to confer
authority on the administrative agency to determine whether the
2227 Cal. (2d)

81, 162 P. (2d) 630.
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terms specified have been met as a matter of fact and to deny resort to judicial review as a matter of right. No constitutional issue
arises if the method for determining facts is a reasonable one and
such method applies to all alike. The court went on to observe that
no provision of the Federal Constitution prevented administrative
agencies being vested with power to make final decisions on legal
questions. State ex
rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare
23
Commission et al.
As the statute in the Oklahoma case did not purport to foreclose an appeal to the courts on an issue of law, the point last mentioned in the opinion was clearly dictum. Since as dictum the
statement is unsupported by legal reasoning, the conclusion is not
wholly persuasive.
In Helms v. Alabama Pension Commission,24 the Pension Commission had removed the petitioner's name from the list of confederate veterans eligible for a pension. Although the enabling
act made no provision for an administrative hearing or for court
review of agency decisions, the pensioner pursued various administrative and legal remedies seeking to be restored to the pension
roll and to have back payments allowed. In the state Supreme
Court the constitutionality of the pension law was assailed as not
meeting the requirements of procedural due process. However,
this argument was rejected by the court which held that where
a bounty or gratuity is involved due process does not require that
notice and a hearing be given by the commission. On the same
premise, the legislature might pursue its own course in setting
up methods for the final determination of eligibility under the
program. When the legislature creates claims of this type it is
not obligated to provide a remedy by judicial review of fact findings made by the administrative agency.
The rationale of the Helms decision strongly suggests that due
process does not prevent the legislature from making the decision
of the Pension Commission final on questions of law as well as
fact. Yet the court's actual holding made it clear that denial of
judicial review would be limited to fact issues. While the reasons
for this limitation were not articulated, it seems reasonable to
infer that the court was reluctant to reach a harsh though logical
result on the basis of a statute that was silent as to the legislative
intention.
In a Federal case the United States Supreme Court found no
constitutional question arising under a Congressional statute which
conferred final adjudicatory power upon the administrative agency.
The statute permitted certain claims by service personnel for personal property losses incident to military service to be reimbursed
by the government upon approval by the Treasury Department.
It was expressly stipulated that the decision of the department on
such claims was to be final and not subject to appeal. The court,
167 P. (2d) 71.
-4231 Ala. 183, 163 So. 805, 163 So. 807 (1935).
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speaking through Justice Brandeis, laid down the rule that where
the United States imposes claims upon itself through creation of
rights in individuals, it is not required to provide a judicial remedy. In instances where rights are created by a statute which provides a special remedy, such remedy is exclusive. If the provision
as to the right and the remedy stood alone, however, we would
not necessarily hold that the remedy excluded judicial review in
situations where the administrative agency's decision involved
no issue of fact and the denial of the claim was based upon an
interpretation of the statute. In the instant case the statute expressly provided "that any claim which shall be presented and
acted on . . . shall be held as finally determined, and shall never
thereafter be reopened or considered." These words clearly show
an intention to confer upon the Treasury an exclusive jurisdiction
25
and to accord finality to the decision. U. S. v. Babcock.
The Babcock case thus seems to stand for the proposition that
when Congress gratuitously grants certain rights to individuals
it can expressly make an agency's adjudication upon these rights
final both on matters of fact and of law. The facts of the case
show that the claimants appealed the disallowance of their claims
by the Auditor of the War Department, and were accorded a hearing before the Comptroller General of the Treasury Department.
Yet it is not clear from the opinion whether the decision turned
on these facts. It remains an open question, therefore, whether
Congress could go so far as to make an agency's decision on a
claim of this type final as to the law and the facts and at the same
time deny the aggrieved claimant both the right to an administrative hearing and access to the courts.
In Silberschein v. U. S.,26 the question arose as to whether
decisions of the Veterans' Bureau upon claims for compensation
under the War Risk Insurance Act were subject to judicial review.
Administration of the act was vested in the director of the Veterans' Bureau who was given express authority to make rules
necessary for the enforcement of the law and to decide all questions
arising under the act. The petitioner's compensation for physical
disability had been first reduced by the agency and then completely
revoked for the reason that his disability had ceased to be compensable. In his action against the agency, the petitioner alleged
that the decision was arbitrary and contrary to the weight of evidence in his case. In ruling adversely to these contentions, the
Supreme Court held that the statute, which created the assertdd
right, authorized the director to decide all questions under it and
his decision of such questions was conclusive and not subject to
judicial review unless the determination was found to be "wholly
unsupported by the evidence, or is wholly dependent upon a question of law or is seen to be clearly arbitrary or capricious."
It should be noted here that the rule in the Silberschein case
-250 U. S. 328, 39 S. Ct. 464 (1918).
- 266 U. S. 221, 45 S. Ct. 69 (1924).
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is not inconsistent with that of the Babcock case. In the Babcock
case the court held that Congress, by the compelling language of
a particular statute, clearly showed an intent to foreclose resort
to the courts on an issue of law. In the Silberschein case the court
could find no such compelling language in the statute.
with the rule ofFor further Supreme Court cases in accord
Crouch v. U. S., 2 7 U. S. v. Williams,2
the Silberschein case see
9
and Meadows v. U. S.2
In Lynch v. U. S.,30 the court decided that Congress by enacting section 17 of the Economy Act 11 had abrogated the contractual
rights of the beneficiaries under certain renewable term government life insurance contracts in violation of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. In deciding this question, the court
observed that Congress by section 5 of the Act had authorized the
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to make final decisions on all
issues of law and fact arising from claims by veterans to pensions,
compensation allowances, and other special privileges. Section 5
thus had nothing to do with War Risk Insurance, and was intended
to deny judicial relief even under the exceptional circumstances
suggested in the Silberschein, Williams, and Meadows cases.
The constitutionality of section 5 was not before the court,
and its review provisions were clearly collateral to the issue raised
by section 17 of the Economy Act. It would therefore seem that
the comments of the court on section 5 were essentially dicta.
A case decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals involved
an appeal from a decision of the Veterans' Bureau to decrease
a sum due on a War Risk policy because of excess awards previously paid in error. One of the grounds on which the administrative action was challenged was that the decision was made without notice or hearing. The statute under which the erroneous
awards had been made denied resort to the courts and made the
decisions of the Veterans' agency conclusive on both the facts and
the law. The court conceded that at one time the rule prevailed
that judicial review was possible when a decision was arbitrary
or capricious, wholly unsupported by the evidence, or wholly dependent upon a question of law. This is the rule set out in Siberschein v. U. S.32 It then pointed out that section 5 of the Economy
Act did away with judicial review even where such special circumstances were present. For this interpretation of section 5,
Lynch v. U. S., 33 was cited. U. S. v. Mroch 4
It is submitted here that the Lynch case is not an actual departure from the rule of the Silberschein case. Both cases can be
266 U. S. 180, 45 S. Ct. 71 (1924).
'-278 U. S. 255, 49 S. Ct. 97 (1929).
"281 U. S. 271, 50 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
'0292 U. S. 571 (1933).
1 38 U. S. C. A.. sec. 705.
"266 U. S. 221.
=292 U. S. 571.
m88 F. (2d) 888 (1937).
2
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reconciled with each other just as the early Babcock case is reconcilable with the Silberschein case. The apparent difference on
one hand between the Babcock and Lynch cases and the Silberschein case on the other derives from a difference in the facts. The
rule governing all these cases is that where Congress imposes
claims upon the United States by creating rights in individuals,
it has constitutional power to make the agency's adjudication upon
these rights conclusive on matters of fact and of law. The courts,
however, will not interpret a statute as making the agency's adjudication of a legal question final unless Congress has manifested
its intent by unequivocal language.3 Access to the courts in the
Silberschein case was regarded as still open on a legal issue because Congress failed to use compelling language to show its intent.
The later case of Dismuke v. U. S.36 reaffirms the rule of the
Babcock case and furnishes some authority for the interpretation
made just above. In the Dismuke case the petitioner had filed a
claim with the Veterans' agency for a retirement annuity based
on an alleged thirty year period of Federal service. The agency
disallowed his claim on the ground that employment as a field
deputy United States marshal could not be counted as service as
an employee of the United States. The petitioner then obtained
a judgment in the district court permitting a recovery of accrued
installments of the annuity. The judgment was then reversed by
the Court of Appeals on the basis that the district court was without jurisdiction because section 13 of the Retirement Act, which
declares that upon receipt of satisfactory evidence the Commissioner of Pensions shall forthwith adjudicate the applicant's claim,
must be construed as vesting the adjudication of claims under it
solely in the administrative agency, and to the exclusion of the
courts. When the case came to the Supreme Court on certiorari,
the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, not for the reason
given by that court, but for the reason that a field deputy United
States marshal was not considered to be an employee of the United
States within the meaning of the Retirement Act. It is clear from
the Supreme Court's opinion that little weight was attached to
the government's contention that the Retirement Act, by implication, forbids employees to assert in the courts rights acquired
under it. The United States is not, the court declared, by the creation of claims against itself, obliged to provide a remedy in the
courts. It may elect to withhold all remedy or it may provide an
administrative remedy and make it exclusive, however erroneous
its exercise. But, in the absence of compelling language, access to
the courts to assert a right which the statute creates will be deemed
to be curtailed only so far as express authority is given to the
' Justice Frankfurter has suggested that the court's construction of these
statutes shows its consistent respect for due process in its "basic meaning" even
where the distribution of government benefits is concerned. See his concurring
opinion in Joint Anti Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 167, 71
S. Ct. 624, 645-646.
297 U. S. 167, 172, 56 S. Ct. 400 (1936).
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administrative officer. Hence, if such officer is authorized to decide question of fact, his decision is final unless he exceeds his
authority by making a decision which is arbitrary or capricious
or unsupported by evidence; or has departed from a procedure
which satisfies elementary standards of -fairness and reasonableness essential to the conduct of the proceeding authorized by
Congress.
It is clear from the court's opinion in the Dismuke case, that
if the Retirement Act had expressly authorized the administrative
officer to make ultimate decisions on issues of law such a provision would have raised no constitutional question. It thereby appears that the court's opinion in the recent Dismuke case is consistent with its earlier opinion in the Babcock case.
For lower Federal court decisions in accord with the dictum
in the Lynch case, see 39Barnett v. Hines,37 Van Home v. Hines,38
and Calderon v. Tobin.
The rule discussed above has been the subject of vigorous
criticism by commentators in the field of administrative law.
Kenneth Culp Davis has cogently argued that a procedure which
the courts regard as a violation of fair play when used to impose
a penalty does not become fair when used to withdraw a benefit.
He therefore recommends that when an agency decision, regardless
of program, involves disputed facts as to an individual-his qualifications, circumstances or past conduct-that individual should
be given an opportunity to know the evidence adverse to his interest and to meet it with evidence and argument. 40 Another writer
contends that it is unrealistic under contemporary conditions to
treat the applicant for a government pension, whose very livelihood may depend upon the receipt of the pension, differently from
one who is said to be injured in his personal or property rights.
The fact that the state may legally withhold a privilege or a pension by repeal of the enabling law should not mean that the agency
can arbitrarily deny the claims of particular individuals without
the claimant
being entitled to a court review upon the legality of
41
the denial.
In 1946 the Assistant General Counsel of the Federal Security
Agency, impressed by the state of decisional law and the omission
of declarations of rights from state public aid statutes, made certain suggestions as to how the legal claim to social benefits might
be made more effective. He urged that declaratory statements
should be written into the statutes which should expressly and
specifically affirm "that the benefit is not to be construed as a
gratuity but as the creation of a right socially and economically
105 F. (2d) 96 (1939).
122 F. (2d) 207 (1941).
'187 F. (2d) 514 (1951).
Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 Yale L. J. 1093 at 1123 (1942).
1,Schwartz, "Administrative Law: 1942-1951," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, at 843844 (1953).

May, 1954

DICTA

justified and subject to judicial review and interpretation and to
the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and equal protection of law as any other right." 42 In another article the same
writer pointed out that the enforceability of justiciable rights to
public aid was essentially dependent on the fiscal implementation
of the program. Therefore, even where an assistance statute included provisions necessary to the establishment of such rights,
the legislature might fail to set aside funds to carry out the program, or to appropriate funds adequate to maintain the standard
defined by the statute. Because of these contingencies, Smith recommends that the right to assistance should be defined as a general charge upon the state treasury and supported by a permanent
appropriation. To avoid the risk of unpredictable drafts upon the
general fund, the provisions establishing the assistance program
should be drafted
so as to define a determinate undertaking on an
43
objective basis.
III.

REVIEW IN THE ABSENCE OF A STATUTE

Ordinarily in the absence of a statutory review procedure,
claimants aggrieved by agency decisions will seek to have a court
review-the agency's action through mandamus proceedings. 44 Litigants invoke this proceeding by addressing a petition to a court
of competent jurisdiction, requesting that a writ of mandamus be
issued, and alleging that a certain public official has failed to
perform some public duty which the petitioner is entitled of right
to have performed. The writ, if issued, takes the form of an order
commanding the official to whom it is addressed to perform the
duty which the official heretofore has failed to perform. 45 The
courts, in passing upon such petitions, refuse or issue the writ
in accordance with certain rules of administrative law. These
rules briefly stated are that mandamus is a proper remedy for
commanding acts of a ministerial nature, for ordering the exercise
of official discretion when the official fails to act, and for preventing abuse of discretion, but not for controlling the manner in
which discretion is exercised. Also, in many jurisdictions mandamus has been denied on the ground of availability
and adequacy
46
of non-statutory or statutory review procedures.
As decisions in a public aid program usually involve the exercise of discretion, it is evident that the rules on the availability
of mandamus tend to restrict the number of court appeals by
41A. Delfield Smith, "Community Prerogative and the Legal Rights and
Freedom of the Individual," 1946 Proceedings of the National Conference of
Social Work 100.
"Op. cit., supra, note 14, p. 268.
" Certiorari is not a practical remedy for the review of administrative action.
Almost all authorities agree that certiorari is not available for the review of
non-judicial action. See Davis, Administrative Law 779.
'The People Ex Rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N. E. (2d) 46,
132 A.L.R. 511.
Davis, Administrative Law 768-772.
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public aid claimants. Other problems arising from the use of this
remedy stem from the inherent difficulty of deciding what duties
are ministerial or discretionary, and what is an abuse of discretion.
The cases discussed below would seem to bear out these conclusions.
A Montana recipient of old-age assistance sought a writ of
mandamus to obtain a restoration of the total amount by which
his former assistance payments had been reduced and to prevent
the agency from continuing to make payments in reduced amounts.
The court refused the petition for the following reasons. An
appropriation in a fixed amount had been apportioned to the State
Board to operate on for a definite period. It then became the
board's duty under the statute to adopt a policy which would best
serve the purpose of the old-age assistance program within the
means furnished for that purpose. Whether it would be wiser for
the agency to make full payments and prematurely expend most
of the appropriation, or whether the recipients now qualified to
receive payments, and the ever increasing number of applicants
who may qualify later, would be more equitably assisted by a prorata decrease in payments, is wholly a question of administrative
discretion vested exclusively by the legislature in the board. It
is not a proper judicial function for a court to interfere with such
discretionary actions of the agency, where it appears that it is
acting within the
scope of its authority. State ex rel. Dean v.
47
Brandjord et al.
Under facts similar to the Brandjord case, a Colorado recipient petitioned the District Court for a writ of mandamus commanding the agency to certify old-age pensions to the state auditor on
the basis of $45 monthly, regardless of available funds. The district court issued the writ requested by the petitioner's prayer,
and the agency appealed the judgment to the Colorado Supreme
Court. On appeal the sole issue before the court was whether or
not the agency had authority to pro-rate assistance payments when
available funds proved insufficient to meet the needs of qualified
claimants. The court declared that if the administrative agency
could not properly pro-rate payments, no other body might. Only
clerical duties, devoid of any element of discretion, had been conferred upon the state auditor and state treasurer. If the agency
could not pro-rate then the full amounts must be certified and the
rule "first come first served" applies. Under this rule the fund
is quickly expended and late comers take nothing, a plain violation
of the constitutional prohibition against discrimination. Upholding the constitutional prohibition would vitiate the $45 per month
provision; upholding the latter would nullify the prohibition against
discrimination at the expense of those probably most needy. In
this emergency, we have no trouble in finding an implied authority
to pro-rate. First, that authority is vested in the agency or is
not vested; second, said chapter 201 (1937 Colorado Session Laws;
4192 P.
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old-age pension enabling statute) must be construed as legislation
implementing said chapter 200 (Article XXIV, Colorado Constitution, pertaining to old-age pension) ; third, said chapter 200
(section 4) expressly limits the agency, in making payments, to
"moneys deposited in the old-age pension fund." It has nothing
to do with moneys not so deposited. Fourth, discrimination is
forbidden; fifth, since errors, if any, made by the county boards,
must be corrected before certification, "the amounts approved,"
as specified in section 19 (chapter 201, 1937 Colorado Session
Laws), must mean the payments approved by the state agency,
and it is only such amounts that are to be certified and paid, and
those are to be paid only "from moneys appropriated." The conclusion is then irresistible that authority to pro-rate is by necessary implication conferred upon the state agency. On the basis
of this conclusion the
judgment of the district court is reversed.
48
Fairall v. Redmon .
In Colorado Public Welfare Board v. Viles, 49 the petitioner
made application to the county director for aid to the blind. His
application was then considered by the local board which determined that the applicant was eligible except that they "did not
believe the reports of the three opthalmologists . . . ." Aid to
the blind was thereupon denied. Obtaining no relief after an administrative hearing, the petitioner made out an alternative writ
of mandamus directed to the state agency. The District Court
granted the petition and ordered the agency to pay a blind pension of $30.00 a month. The state agency then appealed to the
Supreme Court. The appellate court met the argument that no
statutory review is provided, by holding that the district courts
under their general jurisdiction and the Supreme Court by writ
of error under its constitutional powers may review the decisions
of any agency where it is alleged that legal rights have been denied
or that the agency is vested with a discretion which it refuses to
exercise. However, the mandate of the District Court as directed
to the Public Welfare Board should have required the agency to
consider the facts and to act. In modifying the judgment of the
lower court the court observed:
The refusal of the Board to exercise discretion neither
vested the court with the discretion nor entitled plaintiff to the maximum [payment]. The mandate should
have been to act.
The plaintiff in a Federal case sued the Veterans Bureau for
accrued disability compensation payments, payable under an award,
in the amount of $3,000 plus interest. The district court dismissed
the suit and on appeal the Fourth tcircuit Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal. The court observed that if the petitioner's
contention, that the agency's award fixed the right to compensa48
4
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tion so that no discretion to withhold payment remained, is correct,
a proper remedy was not a suit against the United States to adjudicate a liability which had already been determined by the bureau
but a suit against the bureau director for a writ of mandamus to
require him, as the officer charged with the duty of making the
payment, to discharge the duty. Smith v. United States.50
In State ex rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission et al,51 an old-age assistance recipient's name was removed
by the agency from the list of eligible recipients. The recipient
Westbrook then demanded that his name be restored to the list.
Following the rejection of his demand by the agency, Westbrook
petitioned for a writ of mandamus so as to have the agency's action
overruled. Westbrook's petition was thereupon dismissed by the
trial court which upheld the agency's argument that the assistance
law made the agency's decisons final on questions of fact and that
no court had authority to review its determinations or weigh the
evidence. On appeal to the appellate court, the petitioner conceded
that the statute made the agency's decision final on issues of fact.
However, this admission was used as the premise for the contention that the petitioner was without an adequate remedy and
therefore entitled to apply for the extraordinary writ of mandamus. The Oklahoma Supreme Court was not persuaded by this
ingenious argument and ruled adversely to Westbrook. It specifically held that mandamus was not a proper remedy unless there
is a clear legal right for which the law provides no remedy; or
if there is arbitrary or capricious action in the guise of the exercise of discretion that amounts to an abuse of discretion. On
review of the record, the court concluded that it would support
an eligibility decision of approval or denial. For this reason there
was no abuse of discretion by the agency.
The Helms case, previously discussed under topic II, also raised
a question as to the availability of mandamus. Pursuant to a
recommendation of the county grand jury, the Pension Commission removed pensioner Helms' name from the roll of eligible confederate veterans. Helms then applied to the county probate judge
for a correction of the agency's alleged erroneous decision. The
probate judge, after investigating the facts, certified to the commission that Helms' name should be reinstated on the pension roll
and payments allowed back to the date of his removal from the
roll. The Pension Commission thereupon considered the certification and decided that its decision to disallow should stand unchanged. Helms now sought and obtained a writ of mandamus,
in the Court of Appeals, commanding the commission to restore
him to the roll and allow back pay. The commission appealed this
judgment to the Supreme Court which ruled adversely to the
-'57 F. (2d) 998, 999 (1932).
"167 P. (2d) 71.
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petitioner. In reversing the judgment, the court noted that the
commission had considered several factors pertaining to the petitioner's claim in addition to the certificate of the probate judge.
If the agency had been bound by the certificate and was without
discretion, the petitioner clearly would be entitled to the writ. But
the agency was not so bound and could properly make an independent investigation of the facts. Consequently the administrative decision on this claim was based on discretion and judgment.
A decision, authorized to be reached in this manner, is not subject
to modification by mandamus or other judicial review unless the
decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence, wholly dependent
upon a question of law, or is seen to be clearly 52arbitrary or capricious. Helms v. Alabama Pension Commission.
In a South Dakota case a claimant for old-age assistance was
found ineligible by the agency on the basis that he had been receiving support from relatives. The claimant thereupon petitioned
for a writ of mandamus commanding the State Social Security
Commission to approve his application for old-age assistance. The
trial court granted the writ and the agency appealed. On appeal
the appellants did not rely on the usual rules for refusing mandamus but contended that when the legislature created claims
against the state in the nature of gratuities it thereby intended
to eliminate court appeals and to limit appeals by dissatisfied claimants to an administrative hearing before the administrative
agency. The court rejected this interpretation of the statute and
held that since the legislature had not manifested an intention to
give the agency complete discretion in administering the old-age
assistance program and although the statute contained no express
provision for judicial review, it could not find any indication of
an intent to eliminate appropriate judicial remedies. The court
then cited the Dismuke case as authority for its interpretation.
Wood v. Waggoner.53 (Note previous discussion of Dismuke case
under topic II of this article.)
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